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Mandatory Summary Jury Trial: Playing by
the Rules?
Charles F. Webbert
Every week the clerk of each part turned in a scorecard to
Louis Mastroiani, chief administrative judge .... The score-
card showed how many cases the judge in that part had on his
docket and how many he had disposed of that week, through
plea bargains, dismissals, and trials. On the wall of the court-
room, over the judge's head, it said IN GOD WE TRUST. On
the scorecard, however, it said CASE BACKLOG ANALYSIS,
and a judge's effectiveness was rated almost entirely according
to CASE BACKLOG ANALYSIS.1
Judges have grown accustomed to evaluating their perform-
ance by their ability to dispose of cases quickly.2 But their efforts
to slow the backlog of federal cases have only met with an astro-
nomical increase in the case load of the federal courts.' To address
this problem, judges now are turning to methods of alternative dis-
pute resolution ("ADR") and are trying to enlist the help of the
parties themselves in making ADR work.4 Among the techniques
judges are exploring is the summary jury trial ("SJT").
The SJT is a procedure in which attorneys present a summary
of their cases to an "advisory jury." It is designed to encourage
litigants to settle their disputes by illustrating how a trial jury
might evaluate the case. The jury's "verdict" is non-binding, and
t B.A. 1987, University of Minnesota; J.D. Candidate 1990, The University of Chicago.
I Tom Wolfe, The Bonfire of the Vanities 112 (Bantam Books, paperback ed 1987).
2 Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv L Rev 374, 427 (1982).
3 See generally David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis
of Federal District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S Cal L Rev 65 (1981). In 1960,
91,693 cases were adjudicated in the federal district courts. By 1970 that number had
jumped to 117,254. In 1980, 189,778 cases were adjudicated in the district courts, represent-
ing a 107 percent increase in the twenty years from 1960 to 1980. Id at 86-88. The number
of cases filed in district courts doubled during the 1970s alone. Note, Compelling Alterna-
tives: The Authority of Federal Judges to Order Summary Jury Trial Participation, 57
Fordham L Rev 483, 483 n 2 (1988).
" See Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 ABA J 274 (1982)(advocating
ADR). See also Thomas D. Lambros, The Judge's Role in Fostering Voluntary Settlements,
29 Vill L Rev 1363, 1368 (1984).
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the parties are free to disregard the jury's proposed settlement
amount. The use of SJT is not controversial when both parties
consent. But recently, several judges-understandably eager to re-
duce their backlog of cases-have required unwilling parties to at-
tend SJTs on pain of sanction and even criminal contempt.' It is
this kind of judicial pressure that this Comment examines.
This Comment discusses the use of mandatory SJTs in the
federal courts and argues that SJTs should not be forced upon un-
willing litigants. Section I examines the SJT process and the cur-
rent controversy over mandatory SJTs. Section II argues that
mandatory SJTs are not supported by either the text of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure or the intent of those who drafted
them, and that at least one provision of the rules appears to pre-
clude the use of mandatory SJTs. Section III evaluates the effects
of mandatory SJTs on other aspects of our judicial process, specifi-
cally the quality of justice the parties receive in an SJT. This anal-
ysis suggests that mandatory SJTs may lead to inaccurate results
and an unwarranted pressure on litigants to settle.
I. THE SUMMARY JURY TRIAL
A. Description of the Summary Jury Trial
The SJT was created by Judge Thomas D. Lambros of the
Northern District of Ohio." It is designed for cases where the par-
ties are having difficulty reaching settlement because each overesti-
mates the strength of his own case or, equivalently, underestimates
the strength of his opponent's.7 SJTs reduce this "mutual opti-
mism" by providing the parties with more information about the
strength of their cases before proceeding to trial.' SJT's also clarify
issues at an earlier stage, thus making a subsequent trial more
efficient.9
5 See, for example, Strandell v Jackson County, Ill., 115 FRD 333, 336 (S D Ill 1987),
rev'd 838 F2d 884 (7th Cir 1988) (holding attorney in contempt of court for refusal to attend
summary jury trial).
' See Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods
of Dispute Resolution, 103 FRD 461 (1984); Thomas D. Lambros and Thomas H. Shunk,
The Summary Jury Trial, 29 Cleve St L Rev 43 (1980).
1 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 524 (Little, Brown, 3d ed 1986);
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administra-
tion, 2 J Legal Stud 399, 422-23 (1972).
8 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 525 (cited in note 7). See also William Landes,
An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J L & Econ 61, 66 (1971) (on criminal trials);
Lambros, 103 FRD at 468-69 (cited in note 6).
Note, 57 Fordham L Rev at 489 (cited in note 3).
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Most courts use Lambros's formulation of the SJT, in which
the judge initiates the SJT process in a pretrial conference with
parties who cannot agree on settlement terms. 10 The judge suggests
or requires an SJT, schedules it, and asks the parties to brief the
legal issues and submit proposed jury instructions."' Ten potential
jurors are obtained from the regular jury roll' 2 for a modified, and
abbreviated, voir dire.' 3 Each juror fills out a questionnaire, which
is given to the attorneys before examination. 4 The judge allows
each attorney two challenges to the venire, resulting in a six-mem-
ber jury.15 The SJT is not open to the public, and the proceedings
usually are not recorded. 6
The trial judge usually presides at the SJT proceeding, al-
though at least one district court judge sits as a "silent juror" and
allows a law clerk to preside.' 7 Each attorney is given a specific
amount of time (one hour in Lambros's original formulation) in
which to present a summary of his case. No witnesses testify, and
objections are discouraged. The attorneys may, however, summa-
rize "anticipated testimony" from reports or depositions. Following
the presentations, the jury is given an "abbreviated charge" and
deliberates.' The jurors then deliver a consensus verdict and dam-
age recommendation or-if the judge prefers-render verdicts and
damage recommendations individually. 9 After the verdict, the
10 The flexibility of the SJT process makes it difficult to catalogue all the variations
district courts may develop in implementing the process. Thomas D. Lambros, The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: A New Adversarial Model for a New Era, 50 U Pitt L Rev 789,
798-99 (1989). See Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., The Future of Summary Jury Trials in Federal
Courts, 21 John Marshall L Rev 455, 463-64 (1988) and notes therein (discussing some of
the many variations on the basic theme). The few reported cases discussing the use of the
SJT in any detail appear to follow Lambros's formulation with only minor changes. For
another judge's account of his experience with the SJT, see S. Arthur Spiegel, Summary
Jury Trials, 54 U Cin L Rev 829 (1986).
1' Lambros, 103 FRD at 470 (cited in note 6).
12 See Maatman, 21 John Marshall L Rev at 478 (cited in note 10); and Note, 57 Ford-
ham L Rev at 487 (cited in note 3).
I' Lambros, 103 FRD at 470-71 (cited in note 6).
14 Id at 470.
'5 Id at 471. At least one judge has used a three-person jury. See D. Marie Provine,
Settlement Strategies for Federal District Judges 73 n 184 (Federal Judicial Center, 1986).
1" Lambros, 103 FRD at 471 (cited in note 6). See also Cincinnati Gas and Elec. Co. v
General Elec. Co., 854 F2d 900, 902-05 (6th Cir 1988), cert denied 109 S Ct 1171 (1989)
(rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a judge's exclusion of the press from an SJT).
17 Note, 57 Fordham L Rev at 487 n 22 (cited in note 3).
'8 Lambros, 103 FRD at 471 (cited in note 6).
" Id. See also Maatman, 21 John Marshall L Rev at 463 n 36-37 (cited in note 10)
(discussing variations in the "jury verdicts" in SJTs). It is unclear whether and when the
potential jurors are informed their "verdict" will have no binding effect. Compare Maatman,
21 John Marshall L Rev at 463 (cited in note 10) and Note, 57 Fordham L Rev at 487 (cited
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judge often allows the parties to meet with the jurors to discuss
their impressions of the case.20
Voluntary SJT has been used most frequently in Judge Lam-
bros's Northern District of Ohio,2 but has spread to other federal
and state courts.22 Several federal district courts explicitly provide
for SJT in their local rules. The Eastern and Western Districts of
Kentucky are illustrative. Their joint rules provide that "[a] judge
may, in his discretion, set any civil case for SJT or other alterna-
tive method of dispute resolution. ' 2 Other courts provide for SJT
through standing orders.24
B. Differences Between the Summary Jury Trial and Other
Forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution
The term "alternative dispute resolution" has long been used
to describe techniques that assist parties in settling their disputes
out of court. SJTs are often grouped with the more "traditional"
ADR mechanisms of the mini-trial, arbitration, and "rent-a-
judge," or private judging.25 But significant differences exist.
in note 3), with Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alter-
native Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U Chi L Rev 366, 386
(1986)(noting that not telling jurors that their verdict is advisory may undermine the jury
system if people discover the ruse, but telling the jurors of the advisory nature of the verdict
may adversely affect the process). See also Note, Recent Development-Procedure: Sum-
mary Jury Trials in United States District Court, Western District of Oklahoma, 37 Okla
L Rev 214, 217 n 16 (1984) (indicating that in contrast to Judge Lambros, some judges in
the Western District of Oklahoma do not inform jurors that their verdict is advisory).
20 See Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial-An Alternative Method of
Resolving Disputes, 69 Judicature 286, 289-90 (1986); and Lambros, 29 Vill L Rev at 1377
(cited in note 4).
21 See Caldwell v Ohio Power Co., 710 F Supp 194, 202 (N D Ohio 1989); Negin v City
of Mentor, Ohio, 601 F Supp 1502, 1505 (N D Ohio 1985); Rocco Wine Distributors, Inc. v
Pleasant Valley Wine Co., 596 F Supp 617, 621 (N D Ohio 1984); Compressed Gas Corp. v
United States Steel Corp., 857 F2d 346, 348 (6th Cir 1988); Erskine v Consolidated Rail
Corp., 814 F2d 266, 268 (6th Cir 1987). See generally, M. Daniel Jacoubovitch and Carl M.
Moore, Summary Jury Trials in the Northern District of Ohio (Federal Judicial Center,
1982).
22 See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v General Elec. Co., 117 FRD 597, 599 (S D Ohio
1987), aff'd 854 F2d 900 (6th Cir 1988), cert denied 109 S Ct 1171 (1989); Smart v Simon-
son, 1987 US Dist LEXIS 11079 (N D III; December 1, 1987); Lockhart v Patel, 115 FRD 44,
45 (E D Ky 1987). At least two state courts have used SJT. See Bixler v J.C. Penney Co.,
376 NW2d 209, 214 (Minn 1985); Estate of Nibert, 1987 WL 102420 (Ohio App 1987).
23 Local Rule 23, Joint Local Rules for the United States District Courts of the Eastern
and Western Districts-of Kentucky, reprinted in Comment, Compelled Participation in
Summary Jury Trials: A Tale of Two Cases, 77 Ky L J 421, 430 (1989). See also W D Okla
Rule 17(H), cited in Note, 37 Okla L Rev 214, 217 (cited in note 19).
2 See D Mont Standing Order No 6A, reprinted in Lambros, 103 FRD at 496-98 (cited
in note 6).
25 Lambros, 103 FRD at 466-67 (cited in note 6); Note, 57 Fordham L Rev at 485 n 9
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The mini-trial is a voluntary process in which each party's at-
torney makes a brief presentation of its case to the litigants-top-
level management officials in cases involving corporations.2" A
"neutral advisor" (usually an attorney or former judge) acts as
moderator, and at the conclusion of the presentations tells how she
thinks the case would be decided at an actual trial. The parties
then sit down without attorneys present and attempt to resolve the
dispute. If the parties fail to reach a compromise, the neutral advi-
sor may issue a non-binding opinion discussing the strengths and
weaknesses of the parties' positions and predicting the outcome of
a courtroom trial.17
The SJT also resembles arbitration, the best known of the
ADR mechanisms.2 The two forms of arbitration-court-annexed
and private-generally use the same legal rules that govern ordi-
nary litigation.29 Arbitration hearings are abbreviated, adversarial,
and informal. Litigants dissatisfied with the result in court-an-
nexed arbitration, like those dissatisfied with an SJT verdict, have
a right to trial de novo in a district court.30 In private arbitration,
however, parties usually do not have this right: they often have
previously agreed to accept the results of the arbitration.3 1
The SJT also resembles one of the newest ADR methods:
"rent-a-judge" or private judging.3 2 In "rent-a-judge" trials, the
parties agree to conduct a private trial before a hired referee, usu-
ally a retired judge, and to be bound to some extent by the judge's
decision. The parties sometimes agree that the judge will file a re-
port with a federal trial court that may be used to enter judgment.
(cited in note 3). The use of SJT parallels the growing federal court practice of using magis-
trates to aid in the settlement process. See Provine, Settlement Strategies at 58 (cited in
note 15); and Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L Rev 485, 492 (1985).
2'6 Stephen B. Goldberg, Eric D. Green, and Frank E. A. Sander, Dispute Resolution
272-75 (Little, Brown, 1985) ("The parties voluntarily agree to conduct a mini-trial.") (em-
phasis in original).
21 Id; Lambros, 103 FRD at 467 (cited in note 6).
28 See Goldberg, et al, Dispute Resolution at 189-225 (cited in note 26); see generally
Arnold M. Zack, Grievance Arbitration 265-87 (Lexington Books, 1989). See also the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, 9 USC §§ 1-14 (1982) (governing the use of contractual arbitration in
the federal system).
2 Provine, Settlement Strategies at 44-45 (cited in note 15).
30 Id at 48. Litigants who ask for a new trial after court-annexed arbitration take the
risk of paying for the arbitration proceeding if they do not obtain a better result at trial.
31 See Goldberg, et al, Dispute Resolution at 189 (cited in note 26) and Provine, Settle-
ment Strategies at 44 (cited in note 15).
2 See generally Note, The California Rent-A-Judge Experiment: Constitutional and
Policy Considerations of Pay-As-You-Go Courts, 94 Harv L Rev 1592 (1981).
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Unlike arbitration, the parties may appeal the referee's decision
for errors of law or challenge it as being against the weight of the
evidence.33
C. Recent Controversies Over Mandatory Summary Jury Trials
Although voluntary SJTs and most other forms of ADR have
met with general approval, the mandatory SJT is now the focus of
heated debate. The most visible controversy began in 1987 when
the Southern District of Illinois decided Strandell v Jackson
County, Ill.4 The plaintiff in Strandell had filed a civil rights ac-
tion against the county. Chief Judge Foreman, observing that a full
jury trial would take five or six weeks to complete and that the
parties were "poles apart in terms of settlement," ordered the par-
ties to appear at a non-binding SJT in an effort to settle the ac-
tion. 5 The plaintiff's attorney objected to the order, maintaining
that it would force him to reveal his trial strategy and case prepa-
ration prior to an actual trial on the merits.3 6 The court held the
plaintiff's attorney in criminal contempt for his refusal to partici-
pate in an SJT.
Judge Foreman gave three bases for his authority to compel an
SJT. First, he cited a report of the 1984 Judicial Conference adopt-
ing a resolution endorsing the experimental use of SJTs. He
pointed out that an initial draft of the resolution had limited the
Conference's endorsement of SJTs to cases where the parties con-
sented to its use, but that this language had been omitted without
explanation from the final draft of the resolution. Second, Judge
Foreman relied on Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides that settlement may be discussed at a pretrial con-
ference. He found that although Rule 16 was not designed to force
a settlement on unwilling parties, it does permit courts "to order
the litigants to engage in a process which will enhance the possibil-
ity of fruitful negotiations. 3 7 Finally, he pointed to the Speedy
Trial Act,38 which sets forth stringent time limits for commencing
33 See id at 1592-93; Goldberg, et al, Dispute Resolution at 280-81 (cited in note 26);
Lambros, 103 FRD at 466 (cited in note 6).
34 115 FRD 333 (S D I1 1987), rev'd 838 F2d 884 (7th Cir 1988).
35 Id at 334.
31 Id. For additional background, see Maatman, 21 John Marshall L Rev at 468 (cited
in note 10). Maatman argued the Strandell case before the trial court and the Seventh
Circuit on behalf of the sanctioned attorney.
3,Strandell, 115 FRD at 334-36.
18 USC § 3161 et seq (1982).
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trial in criminal proceedings." He noted that the Speedy Trial Act
forces courts to clear criminal cases off the dockets before engaging
in lengthy civil trials, resulting in long delays for civil cases.4 °
These delays, he concluded, further supported SJT.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the order of criminal
contempt, holding that a trial court lacks the power to impose
sanctions upon an attorney who refuses to appear at an SJT.41 The
court reasoned that while the pretrial conference provisions of
Rule 16 were intended to foster the use of settlement, they were
not intended to authorize a mandatory SJT.42 Neither the lan-
guage of Rule 16 nor the intent of its drafters permits a trial judge
to "force unwilling parties into settlement negotiations. '4
Since Strandell, several district courts have rejected the Sev-
enth Circuit's reasoning and imposed SJTs on unwilling litigants.
In Arabian American Oil Co. v Scarfone, the Middle District of
Florida concluded that the "obvious purpose and aim of Rule 16"
is to permit courts to use any process, including compulsory SJT,
in furtherance of "intelligent and effective case management and
disposition. '44 Just four days later, the Eastern District of Ken-
tucky, in McKay v Ashland Oil, Inc., concluded that "a trial
court's requiring participation in an SJT is all but expressly au-
thorized by ... Rule 16."'45 The court found most persuasive the
Judicial Conference's resolution endorsing the experimental use of
SJTs.46 Although it recognized that the SJT is not a panacea for
all cases, the court concluded that following Strandell would
"smother a promising infant in the cradle. '47 The courts' reasoning
in Arabian Oil and McKay recently was adopted by the District of
Minnesota. In Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v Carey-Ca-
nada, Inc., a district court magistrate held that she possessed the
power to order an SJT under FRCP 1 and 16, as well as the "in-
3 Strandell, 115 FRD at 334-36. See also note 116.
40 Strandell, 115 FRD at 336.
4 Strandell v Jackson County, Ill., 838 F2d 884 (7th Cir 1988).
11 Id at 887.
43 Id, citing Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 16. See also Charles A. Wright, Arthur
A. Miller and Mary K. Kane, 6 Federal Practice and Procedure § 1525 at 343 (West, Supp
1987) ("Wright and Miller").
41 119 FRD 448 (M D Fla 1988) (denying defendant's motion to be excused from partic-
ipation in an SJT). The court concluded that Strandell was neither "persuasive [nor] bind-
ing precedent to this Court." Id at 449.
45 120 FRD 43, 48 (E D Ky 1988) (denying plaintiffs' motion to reconsider imposition of
an SJT).
46 Id.
47 Id at 50. See Comment, 77 Ky L J at 438-40 (cited in note 23) (concluding that
Strandell and McKay can be reconciled because of differences in the facts of each case).
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herent powers" doctrine.48 In sum, no reported case from a federal
district or appellate court supports Strandel,49 and commentators
have been equally vocal in rejecting it.50
In order to show how the reasoning of Strandell's critics is
flawed, this Comment will analyze the authority of a federal court
to compel SJTs. In particular, the next section will examine three
commonly cited sources of authority: the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court's inherent powers, and a report of the United
States Judicial Conference.
II. FEDERAL COURT POWER TO COMPEL MANDATORY SUMMARY
JURY TRIALS
A. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Most judges and commentators who favor mandatory SJTs
rely upon various provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. The debate has focused on Rules 16, 83, 1, and 68. Close
examination reveals that these four provisions fail to support
mandatory SJTs.
1. Rule 16.
Rule 16 is the fountainhead of federal courts' power to manage
pretrial procedure, giving trial courts great power to direct the pre-
trial phases of litigation. Rule 16(a) allows courts to direct pretrial
conferences and specifies that pretrial conferences can be used to
48 123 FRD 603, 604 (D Minn 1988). The magistrate explicitly rejected Strandell. Id at
606.
4' The District of Massachusetts recently stated in a footnote unnecessary to the dispo-
sition of the case that a trial court has power to order a summary jury trial under Rule 16.
Home Owners Funding Corp. of America v Century Bank, 695 F Supp 1343, 1347 n 3 (D
Mass 1988). Somewhat questionable, however, is the court's statement that while litigants
can be compelled to participate in an SJT, they must agree to other ADR mechanisms such
as trial before a magistrate or "rent-a-judge." Id. The court offered no explanation for the
different treatments of SJT and other ADR techniques it cited. See also Cincinnati Gas &
Elec. Co. v General Elec. Co., 117 FRD 597 (S D Ohio 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 854
F2d 900 (6th Cir 1988), cert denied, 109 S Ct 1171 (1989) (trial court has inherent power to
conduct SJT as a settlement procedure); Lockhart v Patel, 115 FRD 44 (E D Ky 1987)
(striking defendant's pleadings is a proper sanction for failure to send representative from
home office to attend settlement conference). Both Cincinnati Gas and Lockhart relied
upon the trial court opinion in Strandell while the appeal to the Seventh Circuit was pend-
ing. No federal appeals court other than the Seventh Circuit has addressed the issue.
50 See Lambros, 50 U Pitt L Rev at 804 (cited in note 10)(asserting that Rule 16 calls
for "intensive management and participation in litigation by the court, to the extent. . . of
compelling ADR"). See also Comment, 77 Ky L J at 439-40 (cited in note 23); Note, 57
Fordham L Rev at 491 (cited in note 3).
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facilitate settlement of the case.51 Rule 16(c) states that "settle-
ment or the use of extrajudicial procedures" are appropriate topics
of conversation at a pretrial conference.2 Given that a trial judge
can order participants to attend pretrial conference in order to en-
courage settlement through extrajudicial procedures, it is not un-
reasonable to infer, as so many courts and commentators have,
that a judge can require a mandatory SJT.
There are, however, persuasive textual arguments that Rule 16
rejects the mandatory SJT by negative implication. Although Rule
16(a) allows a judge to direct the parties to attend a pretrial con-
ference for the purpose of settlement, it does not give courts ex-
press power to mandate any procedure for settlement purposes.
Furthermore, Rule 16(c) states that the conference participants
"may consider" the use of extrajudicial procedures, not that the
court "may direct" such procedures. The use of the precatory
"may consider" in the same rule as the mandatory "may direct"
suggests that the drafters intended to give judges less power to
compel extrajudicial proceedings than to compel appearance at a
pretrial conference.
In addition, Rule 16(c)(7) authorizes discussion at a pretrial
conference of "extrajudicial" procedures for exploring settlement.
Most commentators agree that SJTs are not extrajudicial. 3 They
are "conducted inside the courtroom of a federal courthouse,
before an Article III judge, and with jurors selected from the
court's master jury wheel who are paid from congressionally appor-
tioned funds." '54 It is unclear whether Rule 16 addresses ADR tech-
"' Rule 16(a) provides:
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties and
any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference or conferences before
trial for such purposes as (1) expediting the disposition of the action ... and; (5) facili-
tating the settlement of the case.
5' Rule 16(c) states:
The participants at any conference under this rule may consider and take action with
respect to . . . (7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to
resolve the dispute ... and (11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the
action.
11 See Posner, 53 U Chi L Rev at 385-86 (cited in note 19) (finding that the word "ex-
trajudicial" implies that the subsection does not sanction the use of judicial procedures of
dispute resolution such as the SJT). See also Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local
Rules and the Tension with Uniformity, 50 U Pitt L Rev 853, 858 (1989) (contrasting SJT
with extrajudicial consideration of settlement); and Case Comment, Cincinnati Gas & Elec-
tric Co. v. General Electric Co.: Extinguishing the Light on Summary Jury Trials, 49 Ohio
St L J 1453, 1466-68 (1989) (finding that SJT is very close to a full but abbreviated trial
because of the great expenditure of judicial resources).
I" Maatman, 21 John Marshall L Rev at 480 (cited in note 10).
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niques at all.5 But if it does, the presence of the word "extrajudi-
cial" suggests that the drafters intended to sanction only ADR
methods outside the courtroom, such as mediation and
arbitration.5 6
The Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 16 provide only a
little more information about the purpose and intent of the rule.
The purpose of subdivision (c) was to improve the planning and
management of litigation by expanding the 1938 conception of sub-
jects that may be discussed at a pretrial conference.57 Clause (7),
for example, was added to recognize that "it has become common-
place to discuss settlement at pretrial conferences" and to facili-
tate settlement at an early stage of the litigation. 8 Along with
other notes to Rule 16, these unambiguously "pro-settlement"
statements have led some to conclude that the Rule's primary pur-
pose is to broaden a judge's pretrial management powers.5 9
It is erroneous, however, to read the Advisory Committee
Notes as if they solely encourage settlement, for they also reflect
concern for parties not wishing to settle. The Committee noted, for
example:
Although it is not the purpose of Rule 16(c)(7) to impose set-
tlement negotiations on unwilling litigants, it is believed that
providing a neutral forum for discussing the subject might
foster it ... [t]he rule does not make settlement conferences
mandatory because they would be a waste of time in many
cases.
60
In addition to specifically refusing to require courts to conduct set-
tlement conferences, the Advisory Committee also refused to re-
quire courts to hold pretrial conferences. 1
Moreover, although the Committee's comments endorse settle-
ment broadly, they also frequently refer to the more modest goals
" Keeton, 50 U Pitt L Rev at 858 (cited in note 53).
58 See Maatman, 21 John Marshall L Rev at 478 (cited in note 10).
57 FRCP 16(c) Advisory Committee Notes (1983).
58 Id.
9 See, for example, Matter of Sanction of Baker, 744 F2d 1438, 1440 (10th Cir 1984);
and Robert B. McKay, Rule 16 and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 63 Notre Dame L Rev
818, 823 (1988).
00 FRCP 16(c) Advisory Committee Notes (1983) (emphasis added), citing James W.
Moore, Federal Practice § 16.17 at 16-54 (Matthew Bender, 1971); 6 Wright and Miller §
1522 at 334 (cited in note 43).
0' The introduction the the Advisory Committee's 1983 Notes on Rule 16 state:
"[A]lithough scheduling and pretrial conferences are encouraged in appropriate cases, they
are not mandated."
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of removing impediments to settlement and defining the issues.6 2
The Committee's goal of providing a "neutral forum" for settle-
ment discussions indicates that it merely intended to give judges
the opportunity to discuss settlement with the parties at the pre-
trial conference should they so desire. In other words, the drafters'
primary concern may have been to resolve any doubts as to
whether settlement is an appropriate subject of pretrial discus-
sion. 3 The pretrial conference provision appears to be primarily
informational, not coercive in nature.6 4
Rule 16 certainly gives judges power to do more than just pro-
vide a room (their chambers) for the parties to discuss settlement.
It is quite plausible that Rule 16 gives judges the power to ensure
that the parties have thought seriously about settlement, but stops
short of conferring power to require the parties to take specific
steps towards settlement. More specifically, under Rule 16 a judge
may convene a pretrial conference, question the parties on steps
taken toward settlement, ascertain what additional steps they plan
to take, ensure that the parties have considered key facts in the
case that might affect the decision whether to settle, and help the
parties settle the case if they are open to compromise-maybe
even suggesting a voluntary SJT as an innovative way of exploring
settlement.6 5 In other words, the judge can ensure that the parties
have seriously considered such negotiations, but cannot require
that they enter into them.
This reading of Rule 16 is consistent with the drafters' intent
not "to impose settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants," s
and recognizes that litigants may have good reasons not to settle.
For example, a party may wish to reap the benefits of res judicata,
which precludes other parties from bringing future claims that are
identical to the present claim. This requires a court judgment; a
favorable settlement will not suffice. The drafters of Rule 16 surely
respected the fact that litigants have absolutely no duty to bargain
' See FRCP 16(c) Advisory Committee Notes (1983), stating that Rule 16(c)(1) was
designed to "confirm the court's power to identify the ... real issues prior to trial, thereby
saving time and expense for everyone."
6' See FRCP 16(a) Advisory Committee Notes (1983), stating that "the amendment
explicitly recognizes some of the objectives of pretrial conferences and the powers that many
courts already have assumed."
" See Maatman, 21 John Marshall L Rev at 472 (cited in note 10), citing J.F. Edwards
Const. Co. v Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F2d 1318, 1323 (7th Cir 1976).
65 See Provine, Settlement Strategies at 71 (cited in note 15) (reporting that some fed-
eral judges try to "sell" the litigants on the virtues of SJT).
61 FRCP 16(c)(7) Advisory Committee Notes (1983).
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over settlement, and may insist on "their day in court. 67
If compelling an SJT is analogous to convening a conference
to discuss the possibility of settlement, then the authority to do so
might fit within the boundaries of judicial intervention under Rule
16(a). But the analogy does not hold. The parties in an SJT are
submitting the facts of their dispute to a neutral arbitrator for his
non-binding decision. The outcome of the SJT-the amount of the
"jury verdict"-almost certainly will be used by one of the parties
as a basis for a settlement offer. Taking steps to put a "dollar
value" on a case surpasses mere discussion about settlement nego-
tiations; it approximates a settlement negotiation itself.6 8 A judge
who requires an appearance at an SJT is forcing the party to enter
into what corresponds to settlement negotiations. This practice
was rejected by the drafters of Rule 16.
Finally, interpreting Rule 16 to authorize judges solely to facil-
itate and not to coerce settlement is supported by subsequent con-
gressional proposals to amend the rule. The Alternative Dispute
Resolution Promotion Act of 1986,9 as passed by the Senate,
would have required attorneys to advise their clients of ADR op-
tions and to file notice with the court certifying that the clients
were properly notified. 0 The House version was similar.71 The pro-
posed legislation expressly provided that an attorney "shall . . .
advise the party of the existence and availability of alternative dis-
pute resolution options, including extra-judicial proceedings such
67 See National Ass'n of Government Employees, Inc. v National Federation of Fed-
eral Employees, 844 F2d 216, 223 (5th Cir 1988) (failure to compromise a case does not
constitute grounds for imposing sanctions); Del Rio v Northern Blower Co., 574 F2d 23, 26
(1st Cir 1978) (there is no duty to settle a case); G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v Joseph
Oat Corp., 871 F2d 648, 658 (Coffey dissenting), 664 (Easterbrook dissenting) (7th Cir 1989)
(Rule 16 does not grant district court power to compel represented party's presence at set-
tlement conference).
68 One of the foremost judicial proponents of mandatory SJTs, Judge Bertelsman, ex-
plicitly described SJTs as "settlement negotiations" in U.S. v Kentucky Utilities Co., 124
FRD 146, 153 n 7 (E D Ky 1989) (court can take steps to maintain confidentiality of settle-
ment negotiations like SJT). See also Cincinnati Gas, 854 F2d at 904-05; and Case Com-
ment, 49 Ohio St L J at 1463 (cited in note 53); but see Note, 57 Fordham L Rev at 494-95
(cited in note 3) (arguing that an SJT, whether voluntary or mandatory, is not a settlement
negotiation, but merely a technique to foster settlement).
66 Litigation Abuse Reform Act of 1986, Hearings on S 2038 before the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong, 2d Sess (February 3, 1986), in 132 Cong Rec S 848 (Febru-
ary 3, 1986). See also Litigation Abuse Reform Act of 1986, Hearings on S 2038 before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong, 2d Sess (1986).
70 See S 2038, §§ 3(a)-(b) (cited in note 69). See also Maatman, 21 John Marshall L Rev
at 474 n 88 (cited in note 10).
7' See Alternative Dispute Resolution Promotion Act of 1987, HR 473, 100th Cong, 1st
Sess (January 7, 1987), in 133 Cong Rec H 157 (January 7, 1987).
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as mini-trials, and... court supervised arbitration, and SJT pro-
ceedings." 2 However, the proposed legislation did not give judges
the option of making an SJT mandatory. In fact, the proposed bill
stated that each attorney must "indicat[e] whether his client will
agree to one or more of the alternative dispute resolution tech-
niques, '73 and provided that the court could enter an order only
"[i]n the event all parties to an action agree to proceed with one or
more" of the procedures. 4
Thus, even when Congress expressly considered promoting
ADR techniques through Rule 16, it proposed a system that would
be informational (the attorney need only attest that she has in-
formed the client of ADR techniques) and not coercive. If the leg-
islation is passed, Congress will leave the ultimate choice to the
parties, without any judicial interference."s
2. Rules 83 and 1.
Rule 16 is most directly applicable to the question of
mandatory SJTs, but some courts also rely upon Rules 83 and 1.
Rule 83 gives a federal district court the power to "make and
amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these
rules. 17 6 The rule is not an independent source of federal judicial
power; it conditions the validity of a local court rule upon its con-
formity with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a whole.
Courts have held local rules invalid under Rule 83 if they conflict
with the language or intent of one of the federal rules.7 7 Thus, a
local rule need not conflict with the plain words of a federal rule in
order to be impermissible under Rule 83.
Similar reasoning can be used to reject as a justification for
72 S 2038 § 3(a) (cited in note 69). Note that the proposed bill includes the mini-
trial-but not the SJT or court-supervised arbitration-as an example of an extra-judicial
proceeding (the phrase "extra-judicial proceedings such as mini-trials" is separated from
"summary jury trial proceedings"). See text accompanying notes 53-56.
S 2038 § 3(a) (cited in note 69) (emphasis added).
Id (emphasis added).
7' The proposal to amend Rule 16 can be classified as "post-enactment legislative his-
tory." The weight to be given post-enactment legislative history is somewhat controversial.
Contrast Patricia Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 Iowa L Rev 195, 205 (1983); with Andrus v Shell Oil Company,
446 US 657, 666 n 8 (1980).
11 FRCP 83 (emphasis added). For an example of a court relying on a local rule in
mandating an SJT, see McKay, 120 FRD at 44 (citing Local Rule 23, Joint Local Rules for
the United States District Courts of the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky).
"I See, for example, McCargo v Hedrick, 545 F2d 393, 400-02 (4th Cir 1976) (holding a
local rule invalid because it violated the spirit of Rule 16).
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mandatory SJTs Rule l's call for the "just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action. '7' The interpretations of some
courts and commentators notwithstanding, the word "speedy" is
not necessarily the most important in Rule 1, to be read to trump
the remaining language of the rule-and the specific dictates of the
eighty-five rules that follow. 9 The stated purpose of the federal
rules is to promote justice.80 One could even argue that the place-
ment of the word "just" before the word "speedy" in Rule 1 indi-
cates the drafters' intent that justice prevail over speed. In any
event, even if Rule 1 gives courts the discretion to resolve cases
justly and speedily, the trial judge must use his discretion wisely.8
This means that he cannot ignore the context of a federal rule or
apply it without considering its relation to the other federal rules.2
Thus, if Rule 16 does not give courts the power to compel SJT,
Rule 1, like Rule 83, should not be used to achieve the same end.8
3. Rule 68.
Rule 68 is the only provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure that penalizes a party for failing to settle a case. It provides
that if a defendant makes a timely offer of settlement and the
plaintiff rejects it, and if the plaintiff later obtains a judgment for
less than the offered settlement amount, the plaintiff cannot re-
cover post-offer attorney's fees from the defendant. 4 Rule 68,
78 For use of this rationale see Strandell, 115 FRD at 335-36; Note, 57 Fordham L Rev
at 497 (cited in note 3); Lambros, 103 FRD at 469 (cited in note 6).
71 See Note, 57 Fordham L Rev at 493 and n 77 (cited in note 3), citing Real v Hogan,
828 F2d 58, 63 (1st Cir 1987).
80 See 6 Wright and Miller § 1029 at 116 (cited in note 43); Ohio v Arthur Andersen &
Co., 570 F2d 370 (10th Cir 1978).
81 See, for example, 6 Wright and Miller § 1029 at 120 (cited in note 43).
82 Id. See also Coyne-Delany Co. v Capital Dev. Bd. of Illinois, 717 F2d 385, 392 (7th
Cir 1983); Gangemi v Moor, 268 F Supp 19, 21-22 (D Del 1967); Note, Judicial Authority in
the Settlement of Federal Civil Cases, 42 Wash & Lee L Rev 171, 177 (1985).
" For arguments that Rule 1 gives judges broad authority over trial procedure, see
Note, 57 Fordbam L Rev at 493 and n 77 (cited in note 3); Arabian American Oil Co. v
Scarfone, 119 FRD 448, 449 (M D Fla 1988); and Note, 42 Wash & Lee L Rev at 174 (cited
in note 82).
8, FRCP 68 provides, in pertinent part:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a
claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against
the defending party for the money or property or to the effect specified in the offer,
with costs then accrued .... An offer not accepted [within 10 days] shall be deemed
withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine
costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the
offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer.
Rule 68 by its terms does not apply in cases where the defendant prevails. See generally
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then, provides an element of compulsion that Rule 16 lacks: the
rule tells plaintiffs that resisting reasonable settlement offers may
be costly.
The question is how far this policy of encouraging settlement
extends. It can be argued that Rule 68 indicates a broad endorse-
ment of settlement even in cases where it does not expressly apply,
and that the rule sanctions mandatory SJT because it encourages
settlement.8 5 But Rule 68 can also be read as a denial of a federal
court's power to compel an SJT. This is evident from the limited
scope of the rule itself. The Rule 68 cost-shifting apparatus does
not apply to every case that is litigated in the federal courts; it
applies only to offers by defendants, and allows shifting of attor-
ney's fees only when it is provided for by the underlying statute.8 6
Courts should not extend the policy behind a legal rule beyond
the scope provided in the rule itself.87 Mandatory SJTs clearly lie
outside the explicit authority conferred by Rule 68. In fact, when
courts impose mandatory SJT they may even contravene Con-
gress's intent, extending the pro-settlement policy beyond the
boundaries set by the rule. As the Supreme Court recently recog-
nized, "it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent sim-
plistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary
objective must be the law." '88 Rule 68, then, becomes a powerful
argument against the proposition that mandatory SJT is consis-
tent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The drafters of the
federal rules provided in Rule 68 a certain amount of incentive for
parties to settle; they went no further.
In addition, Rule 68's expression of preference for settlement
furnishes no basis for inferring approval of judicially imposed set-
tlement proceedings. Rule 68 is self-executing, and does not confer
any power on a judge.89 Thus, it is somewhat troublesome to read
Rule 68 as a justification for mandatory SJTs. In short, although
Rule 68 does encourage settlement, it is a limited rule with a care-
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v August, 450 US 346 (1981). The Supreme Court most recently ex-
pressed its approval of Rule 68's tendency to promote settlement in Marek v Chesny, 473
US 1 (1985) (upholding the application of Rule 68 against a civil rights plaintiff).
11 See, for example, Note, The Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 68: Toughening the Sanctions, 70 Iowa L Rev 237, 238-39 (1984) (arguing that Rule 68
is a means of reducing litigation and encouraging out-of-court settlement).
11 See Delta Air Lines, 450 US at 352; Marek, 473 US at 8.
67 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533 (1983).
"' Rodriguez v United States, 480 US 522, 526 (1987) (per curiam).
89 FRCP 68 provides that "the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of
the offer" (emphasis added). See also Waters v Heublein, Inc., 485 F Supp 110, 113 (N D
Cal 1979) (holding that a court does not have discretion under Rule 68).
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fully defined domain. Like Rules 16, 83, and 1, Rule 68 does not
give a federal judge the power to compel SJTs. Without the au-
thority of the federal rules, a judge must rely on some other source
for such a power.
B. The Inherent Powers of a Federal Court
Some courts and commentators base a trial judge's power to
compel, attendance at SJTs on a court's "inherent power to manage
its docket." 90 These "inherent powers" are different from those ex-
pressly provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and are
traditionally thought to derive "from the very nature of the judi-
cial system."9 1
The Seventh Circuit recently stated, in a sharply divided en
banc opinion in G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v Joseph Oat
Corp.,2 that federal courts have broad inherent power to manage
their dockets. The court held that even if Rule 16 does not explic-
itly authorize a district court to order litigants represented by
counsel to appear personally at a pretrial conference, a trial court
may issue such an order on the basis of its inherent powers.9 The
court described the inherent power to take action in a procedural
context as "governed not by rule or statute but by the control nec-
essarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to
achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."9"
As conceived by the Seventh Circuit, courts' inherent powers
existed prior to enactment of the federal rules, and under the com-
mon law enabled courts to make rules for themselves. 5 The federal
rules merely carved out and codified those inherent powers de-
voted to rulemaking.9 6 Those areas that were not codified, the ar-
9o See Note, 57 Fordham L Rev at 495-99 (cited in note 3); Lambros, 103 FRD at 469
(cited in note 6). See also McKay, 120 FRD at 48; Strandell, 115 FRD at 335.
91 See Note, 42 Wash & Lee L Rev at 179 (cited in note 82), citing United States v
Hudson and Goodwin, 11 US (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812).
92 871 F2d 648 (7th Cir 1989) (en banc). The Seventh Circuit's opinion reverses a prior
panel opinion. The vote was 6 to 5, with the inherent powers question proving one of the
most contentious points. Id at 657 (Posner dissenting), 659 (Coffey dissenting), 663 (Easter-
brook dissenting), 665 (Ripple dissenting), 666 (Manion dissenting).
93 Id at 652.
94 Id at 651, quoting Link v Wabash R.R., 370 US 626, 630-31 (1962) (holding that
federal courts have an inherent power "of ancient origin" to assess sanctions in response to
abusive litigation).
" See Soo Line R. Co. v Escanaba & Lake Superior R. Co., 840 F2d 546, 551 (7th Cir
1988).
" See Sibbach v Wilson & Co., 312 US 1, 14 (1940), rejecting a defendant's arguments
that powers the parties had before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are retained undiminished. The Court indicated that the Federal Rules erased the old eq-
[56:14951510
Mandatory Summary Jury Trial
gument goes, still exist undiminished and may be exercised to the
extent they remain in harmony with the federal rules.9 In short,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not completely describe
the powers of the federal courts. 8
Though the Supreme Court has recognized the existence of
some inherent powers in the courts, the scope of the inherent pow-
ers not covered by the Federal Rules is traditionally viewed as
quite narrow. These remaining powers grow out of well-acknowl-
edged historical roots and apply only in "narrowly defined circum-
stances."9 A court's inherent powers are limited to those "neces-
sary to the exercise of all others," 100 necessary for a court "to
preserve its own existence," 10' and "absolutely essential" for the
functioning of the judiciary. 0 2 They encompass "an extremely
narrow range of authority involving activity so fundamental to the
essence of a court as a constitutional tribunal that to divest the
court of absolute command within this sphere is really to render
practically meaningless the terms 'court' and 'judicial power.' "103
Most of the courts invoking inherent powers have done so in order
to sanction those who abuse the judicial process.104
There are at least three reasons why the inherent powers are
construed so narrowly. First, the powers are very difficult to define.
Even the Heileman majority conceded that a court's inherent pow-
ers are undefined and "not frequently documented."' 05 In addition,
uity powers of the parties and recast them in codified form.
97 Id.
" Stuckey v Northern Propane Gas Co., 874 F2d 1563, 1573 (11th Cir 1989); HMG
Property Investors, Inc. v Parque Indus. Rio Canas, Inc., 847 F2d 908, 915 (1st Cir 1988).
99 Roadway Express v Piper, 447 US 752, 765 (1980). See also Link, 370 US at 629.
100 United States v Hudson and Goodwin, 11 US (7 Cranch) 32-33 (1812).
101 Id.
101 Levine v United States, 362 US 610, 616 (1960).
103 Eash v Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F2d 557, 562 (3d Cir 1985) (emphasis added).
-- Eash, 757 F2d at 561. See Roadway Express, 447 US at 764-67; (sanctions for use of
legal process solely to harass); Link, 370 US at 629-33 (federal court has inherent power to
dismiss case sua sponte for failure to prosecute); Young v United States ex rel Vuitton et
Fils S.A., 481 US 787 (1987), and Levine, 362 US at 615 (punish for contempt); Hazel-Atlas
Glass Co. v Hartford-Empire Co., 322 US 238, 244 (1944) (equitable power to set aside
judgments obtained through fraud); Universal Oil Products Co. v Root Refining Co., 328 US
575, 580 (1946) (sanctions for the perpetration of frauds on the court). One commentator
has written that this branch of the inherent powers amounts to "docket control," or the
ability to sanction parties for being "lazy." See Note, 57 Fordham L Rev at 497 (cited in
note 3). However, the cases relied upon by that commhentator, Roadway Express and Link,
involved sanctions for abuse of the judicial process, and not mere laziness.
'15 Heileman, 871 F2d at 651, citing Brockton Savings Bank, 771 F2d 5, 11 (1st Cir.
1985). Inherent powers have been described as "nebulous" and "shadowy" even by those
who support mandatory SJT. See Note, 57 Fordham L Rev at 495 (cited in note 3); Steven
B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
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inherent powers are troublesome because they are shielded from
democratic control. For this reason, the Supreme Court has coun-
seled that they be exercised only "with restraint and discretion. 10 6
Finally, there may be constitutional limitations on the scope of in-
herent powers. Even the power to sanction parties for contempt
rests rather uneasily upon the provisions of Article 111,107 and ex-
tensions of the inherent powers beyond the power to sanction must
be viewed with suspicion.
Moreover, as the Seventh Circuit explicitly recognized in
Heileman and Strandell, a court's inherent power, like its Rule 83
power to make local court rules, is limited to those cases where the
power sought to be exercised does not conflict with the other Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. 08 In crafting the rules, Congress and
the Supreme Court carefully balanced the need for efficiency
against the need to protect individual rights. 10 9 District courts can-
not use inherent authority to formulate procedural rules at odds
with the Constitution or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1" 0
Such exercise of unspecified powers "would confer on the judiciary
discretionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the
law it is charged with enforcing.""'
dure: Some Questions About Power, 11 Hofstra L Rev 997, 1004 (1983).
100 See Roadway Express, 447 US at 764.
107 See Young, 481 US at 816-17 (Scalia concurring) (arguing that judicial prosecution
of parties who disregard court orders is not an exercise of the Article III judicial power to
act as a neutral adjudicator). But see In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F2d 1254, 1261 (2d Cir
1984), stating that courts must have the power to protect themselves from vexatious con-
duct that impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions, and cannot be dependent
upon another branch of government for that power.
108 See Heileman, 871 F2d at 652; Strandell, 838 F2d at 886.
109 See S Rep No 1744, 85th Cong, 2d Sess (June 23, 1958), in 1958 USCCAN 3023,
3026 (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are carefully balanced in order to
recognize both "the need for expedition of cases and the protection of individual rights");
Strandell, 838 F2d at 886 (federal rules reflect delicate balancing process between Congress
and the Court). See generally Sibbach, 312 US at 14-16 for discussion of the balancing pro-
cess between Congress and the Court. See also Bank of Nova Scotia v United States, 108 S
Ct 2369, 2374 (1988) (district court may not dismiss an indictment for prosecutorial miscon-
duct when Congress and the Court struck balance in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52
permitting harmless error). This balancing is the joint responsibility of the legislative and
judicial branches of government. See also Heileman, 871 F2d at 659 (Coffey dissenting),
noting the similarity of the Court-Congress balancing under criminal cases like Bank of
Nova Scotia and civil cases like Strandell. See the Rules Enabling Act, 28 USCA §§ 2072,
2073, 2074 (West 1966 & Supp 1988) (giving the Supreme Court power to prescribe general
rules of procedure).
11 Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S Ct at 2374, citing United States v Hasting, 461 US 499,
505 (1983). In Bank of Nova Scotia, the Court dealt with a federal court's exercise of its
"supervisory power," the criminal law equivalent of a court's "inherent power" in civil cases.
See also Heileman, 871 F2d at 659 (Coffey dissenting).
... United States v Payner, 447 US 727, 737 (1980).
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Courts sometimes attribute the authority to compel SJT to a
novel inherent power deriving from "necessity" or convenience. 2
But the Supreme Court has rebuffed attempts by district court
judges to exercise wide-ranging power just because it is convenient
to do so. In Thermtron Products, Inc. v Hermansdorfer,"3 for ex-
ample, the federal district judge had unilaterally remanded the
case back to state court, citing his crowded docket and the fact
that there was not enough time to try the case." 4 The Supreme
Court held that the federal judge erred in remanding the action on
grounds not listed in 28 USC § 1447(c). 11 5 The Court rejected argu-
ments that the trial court's docket was too crowded to keep the
case, reasoning that "an otherwise properly removed action may no
more be remanded because the district court considers itself too
busy to try it than an action properly filed in the federal court in
the first instance may be dismissed or referred to state courts for
such reason."'" 6
Thus, arguments relying upon a court's inherent powers must
recognize the limitations of those powers. It strains credulity to as-
sert that the power to compel parties to take steps in settling a
case is indispensable or "fundamental to the essence of a court."'1 7
Concerns of convenience and efficiency do not justify creation of a
new inherent power that is undefined, shielded from democratic
control, and unsanctioned by the congressional-judicial balancing
process of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the inherent
powers doctrine does not justify mandatory SJTs.
C. Judicial Conference Approval of Mandatory SJTs
To bolster their authority to impose mandatory SJTs, a few
"' Eash, 757 F2d at 563.
1. 423 US 336 (1976).
"I Id at 339.
115 Id at 345. 28 USC § 1447(c) (1982) provides in part: "If at any time before final
judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the
district court shall remand the case.... ."
6 Thermtron, 423 US at 344. As noted, the lower court in Thermtron based its re-
mand on crowded dockets and lack of trial time. This reasoning parallels Strandell, where
the trial court based its decision to compel an SJT in part on an interpretation of the
Speedy Trial Act, 18 USC § 3161 et seq (1982). See text at notes 39-40. The Strandell court
failed to notice, however, that other factors may contribute to the slow movement of the
civil docket, such as the rules of discovery but the mere fact that there are some things that
slow down the civil docket does not suggest mandatory SJT is a logical necessity. Further-
more, the drafters of the Speedy Trial Act must have been aware that it would delay civil
litigation; their failure to provide for an analogous speedy trial act for civil cases suggests
they did not find the Speedy Trial Act's effect on the civil docket a serious matter.
" Eash, 757 F2d at 562.
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courts have pointed to modifications in the initial draft of a report
of the 1984 Judicial Conference. The draft endorsed SJTs, but
"only with the voluntary consent of the parties.""' 8 In the final
draft of the resolution, however, the "voluntary consent" language
was dropped without explanation." 9 The trial courts in both Mc-
Kay and Strandell found this omission persuasive, inferring that
the conference viewed mandatory SJTs as consistent with the fed-
eral rules.20
The Judicial Conference has never issued an explicit endorse-
ment of mandatory SJTs, however, and the McKay and Strandell
courts overlooked one of the most plausible explanations for the
omission: the conference simply did not wish to take a position on
the touchy topic of mandatory SJTs. Another explanation for the
omission of language in a later draft is lack of confidence in the
clarity of the omitted language. Neither court explored these
possibilities.
The views of a committee of the Judicial Conference, more-
over, are only persuasive and not binding authority.' 2 ' Other judi-
cial committees have rejected mandatory SJTs.' 2 ' Judicial Confer-
ence pronouncements have no binding force because the handful of
judges participating in the conference are not promulgating rules.
Thus, their comments cannot be given the same weight as com-
ments by the drafters of Rule 16.123 Even if the Judicial Confer-
ence were acting in an administrative rulemaking capacity, the Su-
preme Court has held that the conclusions of judges acting in a
rulemaking capacity are not entitled to the same deference as their
18 The original draft provided that "the Judicial Conference endorses the use of sum-
mary jury trials, only with the voluntary consent of the parties, as a potentially effective
means of promoting the fair and equitable settlement of lengthy civil jury trials." Report of
Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System Agenda G-13 4
(GPO, 1984).
19 The final draft omitted the clause "only with the voluntary consent of the parties."
Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 88 (GPO,
1984). There was, however, no explanation for the omission of the language. On the absence
of a documented explanation for the change, see Maatman, 21 John Marshall L Rev at 457
& n 11 (cited in note 10).
"I See Strandell, 115 FRD at 334-35; McKay, 120 FRD at 48. See also Lambros, 50 U
Pitt L Rev at 803 (cited in note 10) (finding the Judicial Conference report significant).
121 For a description of the composition and function of the Judicial Conference, see 28
USCA § 331 (West, 1968 and Supp 1988).
"I The Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit rejected mandatory ADR techniques
including SJT in its 1986 report. Second Circuit Committee on the Pretrial Phase of Civil
Litigation, Final Report, reprinted at 115 FRD 453, 457 (1986). Neither Strandell nor Mc-
Kay mentioned this rejection of mandatory SJT.
123 See Maatman, 21 John Marshall L Rev at 473 n 81 (cited in note 10).
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decisions on questions of law. 24 Therefore, the conference's views
are no more persuasive than a trial judge's decision to impose an
SJT in a real case. In short, the Judicial Conference resolution is
at most a guide to what a handful of respected judges think about
the question. 125
III. MANDATORY SUMMARY JURY TRIAL AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS
An SJT is not a costless procedure. Indeed, SJT imposes mon-
etary costs on litigants, as well as costs in the form of pressure to
settle for the amount of the SJT "verdict." If the SJT yields inac-
curate results, such costs are unwarranted. This section briefly ex-
amines the overall quality and effectiveness of mandatory SJTs.
A. Lack of Evidentiary and Procedural Safeguards in the SJT
One danger in forcing parties to appear at an SJT is that the
result may rest on inaccurate, or at least inadequately tested, facts.
Several factors contribute to this danger: (1) the usual rules of evi-
dence may not apply at an SJT; (2) witnesses are not permitted;
and (3) voir dire is greatly abbreviated. This section examines each
factor in turn.
Where, as in our adversarial system, the parties are responsi-
ble for finding and presenting facts to the court, a critical control
mechanism is the ability of the opposing party to challenge the
facts placed into evidence. But at least one court has stated that
the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in an SJT.2 6 If taken
to an extreme, this lack of evidentiary protection could result in
the introduction of irrelevant evidence. 27
Although Judge Lambros's formulation of the SJT incorpo-
121 See Mississippi Publishing Co. v Murphree, 326 US 438, 444 (1946) (fact that Su-
preme Court promulgates rules as recommended by the Advisory Committee does not fore-
close consideration of their validity, meaning, or consistency). See also Grand Bahama Pe-
troleum Co., Ltd. v Canadian Transportation Agencies, Ltd., 450 F Supp 447, 450 (W D
Wash 1978).
125 Most judges on the Judicial Conference are trial court judges, and therefore are
likely to endorse a proposal that is expected to speed up the civil docket.
120 Cincinnati Gas, 854 F2d at 904. But Lambros's original formulation of the SJT pro-
vided that only evidence admissible at trial would be allowed, although he discouraged ob-
jections. Lambros, 103 FRD at 471 (cited in note 6). See also Case Comment, 49 Ohio St L J
at 1454 (cited in note 53) (only admissible evidence permitted at SJT).
121 See FRE 402 and 403. Judge Lambros writes that the judge can always incorporate
basic rules of evidence into the SJT in order to prevent the introduction of improper evi-
dence. But he does not indicate which rules he would incorporate as "basic." See Lambros
and Shunk, 29 Cleve St L Rev at 51 (cited in note 6).
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rates the basic rules of evidence, he discourages formal objec-
tions.12 8 One attorney who participated in an SJT voiced concern
over his inability to object:
The inability to object.., gave the plaintiffs carte blanche to
present whatever arguments and versions of the facts they
chose, regardless of whether they would have been admissible
at trial. Plaintiffs' [presentation] bore no resemblance to
courtroom testimony. They had the look and tone of investi-
gative journalism and concentrated on creating emotion
rather than addressing the facts .... Rebuttal time also gave
the plaintiffs.. . an obvious advantage, since they could have
the last word without fear of objection or surrebuttal.129
Thus, even though a conscientious judge may be on the lookout for
attempts to introduce patently inadmissible evidence, the flexibil-
ity and informality exalted by proponents of the SJT make possi-
ble serious transgressions of the rules of evidence.
When evidence is introduced at an SJT that would be in-
admissable at a regular trial, the results a "jury" reaches based on
that information are suspect. 130 To be sure, the parties may dis-
count their faith in the jury's recommendation to reflect the fact
that the jury did not get the "true picture." If this happens, how-
ever, the SJT loses some or most of its value as an information-
producing mechanism. This problem could be avoided, of course,
by requiring that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply at all SJTs,
but such a requirement would only make the SJT more complex
and would probably make the process longer and less desirable as a
voluntary means of alternative dispute resolution.
A second factor leading to inaccurate results is the prohibition
of witnesses at SJTs.'3' Instead, attorneys may summarize antici-
pated "witness testimony" from reports or depositions. 132 These
statements cannot be challenged by cross-examination, and the
SJT jury cannot evaluate the demeanor or credibility of the wit-
nesses; consequently, two of the most valued methods of discerning
the truth at trial are removed. 33 In cases where witness credibility
Lambros, 103 FRD at 471 (cited in note 6).
129 Clifford J. Zatz, Summary Jury Trial: The Settlement of a Toxic Tort Case, 2 Tox-
ics L Rptr 929, 933-34 (1988).
130 See Maatman, 21 John Marshall L Rev at 482-83 (cited in note 10).
131 Lambros, 103 FRD at 471 (cited in note 6).
132 See text at note 18.
133 See Resnik, 96 Harv L Rev at 408 n 137 (cited in note 2). See also Lon L. Fuller,
The Adversary System, in Harold J. Berman, ed, Talks on American Law 30, 39 (Vintage,
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is an issue, then, the jury's advisory verdict in an SJT could be
especially inaccurate.1 3
4
A third factor that could result in inaccurate SJT results is
abbreviated voir dire. In Judge Lambros's original formulation of
the SJT, only ten potential jurors are selected, and counsel are
permitted only two challenges each.135 The attorneys rest their
challenges only on the "basic information" contained in question-
naires that each potential juror completes. These questionnaires
are normally prepared by the court."3 6 Sometimes voir dire takes
only 15 minutes.1 37 Unless the parties are given some role in select-
ing the questions that will be asked on this form, they are not as
free to elicit information from the decision makers as they would
have been in the context of a regular jury trial. In short, although
hailed as a method of "relieving counsel and the court from having
to obtain the information from each potential juror during voir
dire,"'35 the abbreviated process of juror selection severely limits
the amount of information available to the attorneys about the
"jurors" who hear the case.
B. Effects of the Mandatory SJT on the Unwilling Litigant
As the above section indicates, the jury presiding over an SJT
draws its conclusions from a record that is composed largely of
claims untested by the opposing party. Proponents of the
mandatory SJT may argue that we need not worry about the lack
of fidelity to the protections of a full jury trial, and any resulting
unwarranted pressure to settle, since a party is free to reject the
advisory SJT verdict and pursue the case to a full trial with the
usual evidentiary and procedural safeguards. These arguments,
however, overestimate the parties' "freedom" to ignore the SJT
verdict. An unwilling party may in fact be under great pressure to
settle for the amount of the SJT verdict. Mandatory SJTs also cre-
ate practical difficulties for parties unwilling to settle, such as the
rev ed 1971) (discussing an American Bar Association study showing that without adversary
presentation of facts, judges and jurors have a tendency to reach conclusions at an early
stage of the litigation and adhere to those conclusions even though conflicting considera-
tions later develop).
,3 See Comment, 77 Ky L J at 437 (cited in note 23).
"' See Lambros, 103 FRD at 471 (cited in note 6). Lambros uses a six-member jury. At
least one judge has held an SJT using only three jurors. See Provine, Settlement Strategies
at 73 n 184 (cited in note 15).
136 Lambros, 103 FRD at 470, 490-91 (cited in note 6).
" Maatman, 21 John Marshall L Rev at 462 (cited in note 10).
Lambros, 103 FRD at 470 (cited in note 6).
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loss of strategic options and the additional cost of preparing for an
SJT.
It is usually the case that one party ("A") will be under
mounting pressure to settle by the end of the SJT. The judge may
be pushing for settlement on the basis of the jury's findings in an
SJT. A's opponent may also be making settlement offers based on
the results of the SJT-offers which, if rejected, may preclude A
from recovering post-offer costs under Rule 68.181 The judge's per-
ceptions, the opponent's offer, and even A's modified opinion of his
own case, however, are based on possibly erroneous evaluations of
the strength of A's case. Thus, the pressure on A may be
unwarranted.
The potential inaccuracies of an SJT are especially trouble-
some for corporate litigants because an SJT verdict that is sub-
stantial relative to a firm's assets may be material information that
must be disclosed to shareholders. 140 This danger further pressures
the firm to settle rather than continue on to trial. In this setting,
"the summary trial becomes the real trial rather than just an aid to
settlement. It is a very cheap real trial and that is all to the good,
but it may also be an unreliable method of adjudicating a substan-
tial dispute."''
Parties that resist these pressures to settle face other disad-
vantages as well. Mandatory SJTs may prevent each party from
keeping its strategies quiet until an actual trial on the merits. It is
true that courts usually require the parties to exchange witness
lists and summaries of testimony before trial. Since a summary
jury trial is based on facts disclosed by discovery and is meant to
be a synopsis of the actual trial, it is hard to see how anything
would be disclosed by a summary jury trial that would not be dis-
closed before the real trial anyway. Judges therefore usually doubt
attorneys' claims that there are still "secrets" that legitimately can
be kept until the day of trial. Although the advent of liberal dis-
covery rules has outmoded the "sporting" theory of litigation,142 an
I' See text accompanying notes 84-89.
140 See Posner, 53 U Chi L Rev at 387 (cited in note 19). Note, however, that Posner
described this argument as tenuous. See also § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 USC § 78j(b) (1982) governing employment of deceptive devices in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security. It is also possible that stock prices would fluctuate if such
information "leaked" to investors.
41 Posner, 53 U Chi L Rev at 387 (cited in note 19).
142 "Trial by ambush has long since been eliminated from the federal system." McKay,
120 FRD at 48; Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 FRD 603,
606 (D Minn 1988).
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attorney may still keep some "secrets" prior to trial. In fact, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure affirmatively protect some ele-
ments of a trial. Rule 26(b)(3), for example, protects against dis-
closure of an attorney's mental impressions and legal strategies.'
An SJT exposes all of this information. If the parties do not settle
after an SJT, the attorneys will go to trial with a new understand-
ing of the case, and new information about their opponent's trial
strategy.14 4 This information would ordinarily have been protected
prior to trial by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Moreover, not every judge waits for the completion of discov-
ery to order an SJT. This poses two problems. First, it may in-
crease the inaccuracy of the SJT "verdict" if the parties are not
fully prepared or informed or about the case. Second, it may re-
ward the lazy or slow party at the expense of the diligent one. In
Strandell, for example, the plaintiffs' attorneys had engaged in vo-
luminous discovery before the court ordered an SJT; the defend-
ants had done virtually none. 4 5 The trial court had at one point
denied the defendant's motion to compel production of the state-
ments of several of the plaintiffs' witnesses on the grounds of privi-
lege.146 This left the plaintiffs with legitimate "secrets" even after
pretrial discovery. But the mandatory SJT that the court ordered
later would have effectively eliminated the statements' secrecy and
privilege, since the plaintiffs would have been under a great deal of
pressure to present her best case-which necessarily included the
privileged statements. One of the plaintiffs' attorneys described
this "Hobson's choice" as follows:
[The] order compelling participation in the [SJT] placed
plaintiffs' counsel in a position of adopting one line of strategy
different from that of a full trial on the merits. Plaintiffs'
counsel would have had to confine their presentation to con-
clusory arguments of the defendants' alleged liability in order
to avoid the risk of irreparable harm and injury to their case,
which would be caused by revealing the privileged witness
statements in the summary jury trial. Since defense counsel
had failed to undertake any discovery with respect to wit-
nesses, defense counsel therefore would become the recipient
14s "[TIhe court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney.... ." FRCP 26(b)(3).
244 Maatman, 21 John Marshall L Rev at 472 (cited in note 10).
145 Id at 468.
146 Strandell v Jackson County, Ill., 7 Fed R Serv 3d 715 (S D Ill 1986); Maatman, 21
John Marshall L Rev at 468 (cited in note 10).
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of the specifics of testimony in the [SJT] that they had not
bothered to investigate.147
Even if discovery is complete, an SJT aids a party who has done
shoddy discovery, as the defendants in Strandell apparently did.
Finally, supporters of mandatory SJTs often overlook the ad-
ditional monetary costs that SJTs impose on the parties. When
settlement fails, a litigant forced to endure an SJT before getting a
"day in court" must prepare twice for one trial.14 This increases
the costs of the eventual trial, and may persuade some parties to
settle earlier than they would have otherwise in order to avoid the
duplicate expenses. While it could be argued that the extra prepa-
ration helps the attorneys become organized earlier in the litiga-
tion,"49 a cost-conscious litigant probably will not appreciate the
extra court-ordered preparation. It also is not clear why judges
should force attorneys to be prepared for trial before the actual
trial date. The imposition of these additional costs is particularly
unwarranted when one of the parties has a legitimate reason for
litigating the case once the SJT is finished. 5 '
C. Empirical Evidence of the Effects of the SJT: Will It Work?
A large piece of the puzzle that is missing in any analysis of
the SJT (and more importantly of the mandatory SJT) is its effec-
tiveness in increasing settlement rates. Proponents of the
mandatory SJT often slight the fact that it consumes public re-
sources.' Many SJTs last longer than the "ideal" one-half day
proposed by Judge Lambros 52 and extend to several days. 53 It
could be argued that the cost savings from cases that do settle af-
ter an SJT would more than offset the extra costs associated with
going through an SJT and then a later trial if the case does not
settle. Such an argument, however, completely lacks empirical sup-
"'7 Maatman, 21 John Marshall L Rev at 475 (emphasis added).
"' See Note, 57 Fordham L Rev at 489-90 (cited in note 3) (some attorneys resent
mandatory SJT because it forces double preparation).
"I See, for example, id at 490; Spiegel, 54 U Cin L Rev at 835 (cited in note 10).
150 See text at notes 66-67.
'- See Posner, 53 U Chi L Rev at 373, 382 (cited in note 19).
152 See Lambros, 103 FRD at 469, 471 (cited in note 6).
See Zatz, 2 Toxics L Rptr at 930 (cited in note 129), reporting that a summary jury
trial in a toxic torts case took three days to complete. The "jury" was divided into two
groups, each giving separate verdicts. One jury rendered a verdict of $2.8 million for the
plaintiffs, the second rendered a verdict of $300,000 for the plaintiffs. See also Richard A.
Enslen, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Summary Jury Trial in a Toxic Tort Case, 2 Tox-
ics L Rptr 1015 (1988); and Maatman, 21 John Marshall L Rev at 464-67 (cited in note 10).
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port. 54 Judge Richard Posner has commented on the noticeable
lack of empirical data supporting either side of the argument, stat-
ing his lack of enthusiasm for the usual "anecdotes, glowing testi-
monials, confident assertions, [and] appeals to intuition" advanced
to support the effectiveness of the SJT.155 The importance of
resolving such arguments accentuates the need for empirical infor-
mation on the rather complex questions involved.
Some commentators have offered evidence of the effectiveness
of SJTs in increasing settlement rates. Judge Lambros, for exam-
ple, maintains that the use of SJTs has led to a ninety percent
settlement rate in the Northern District of Ohio: 5 ' an impressive
figure, but most studies show that in fact over ninety percent of all
cases settle before trial. 5 7 Thus, Lambros's statistics may stand for
the proposition that the SJT does nothing to increase the settle-
ment rate.
In fact, some studies show that pretrial efforts at encouraging
settlement usually waste judicial resources. One of the first studies
of mandatory pretrial conferences showed that they "reduced the
efficiency of the court by consuming judges' time in handling con-
ferences rather than in trying cases."'' 58 The early studies also
showed that cases submitted to mandatory pretrial conference had
roughly the same settlement rate as those cases that did not go to
mandatory pretrial conference.'59 This conclusion tends to confirm
Judge Posner's fear that the SJT wastes judicial resources because
it is too lavish with the judge's time.160 Judge Posner conducted his
own concededly "crude" study of districts in which SJTs are used.
He found that there was no support for the conclusion that SJTs
increase judicial efficiency.""
In sum, if parties reach settlement with equal frequency under
mandatory and voluntary settlement conditions, judicial settle-
'" See, for example, Menkel-Meadow, 33 UCLA L Rev at 486-87, 492-98 (cited in note
25) (suggesting that claims regarding the efficacy of any technique of alternative dispute
resolution lack empirical support).
'55 Posner, 53 U Chi L Rev at 367 (cited in note 19).
156 Lambros, 50 U Pitt L Rev at 800 (cited in note 10).
157 William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, The Adversary Process, and Discovery
Reform, 50 U Pitt L Rev 703, 707-08 (1989); and Menkel-Meadow, 33 UCLA L Rev at 502
(cited in note 25).
158 Menkel-Meadow, 33 UCLA L Rev at 493.
159 Id.
160 Posner, 53 U Chi L Rev at 382 (cited in note 19).
"I' Id at 374-85. For other attempts to verify the effects of SJTs, see Provine, Settle-
ment Strategies at 75-76 (cited in note 15). For other attempts to find empirical evidence
regarding the effectiveness of pretrial techniques in general, see Jacoubovitch and Moore,
Summary Jury Trials in the Northern District of Ohio at 7, 11-13, 17 (cited in note 21).
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ment management must be an inefficient waste of judicial re-
sources. 16 2 In addition, mandatory settlement procedures will cost
litigants more than they save in litigation fees. 6 3 The uncertainty
surrounding the efficacy of pretrial settlement techniques counsels
that they not be imposed against the will of the parties.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, when read in conjunction with the comments of the draft-
ers, do not support the use of mandatory SJTs. In addition, the
presence of Rule 68 suggests that Congress went only so far in au-
thorizing the application of pressure on litigants to settle their
case, but no further. Resort to the "inherent powers of the judici-
ary" is of little help: the inherent powers have always been con-
strued narrowly and have never been used to allow a court to force
a party to consider resolving a dispute in a particular way.
Mandatory SJT is also likely to lead to inaccurate results because
normal checks in our judicial system, such as the right to cross-
examination and other evidentiary rules, are missing from the SJT.
The goal of reducing the strain on the federal judicial system
is a laudable one. Judges are expected to cure a backlog of cases
that they did nothing to create or aggravate. But reducing the
strain on the federal courts should not involve dangerous experi-
mentation with techniques that are unsupported by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and unlikely to be effective in practice.
102 See Menkel-Meadow, 33 UCLA L Rev at 494 (cited in note 25).
163 Id at 512.
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